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China's rapid emissions growth and global climate change policy Ross Garnaut, Frank Jotzo and Stephen Howes The world has entered a period of exceptionally fast economic growth, with rapid economic development especially in China, followed by India and many other low-income countries. Early twenty-first century rates of economic growth have been even higher than the average in the 'Golden Age' of the 1950s and 1960s, so the current period could be called the 'Platinum Age' (Garnaut and Huang 2007) . This rapid economic growth goes hand in hand with increasing resource use and pressure on the environment, including the build-up of greenhouse gases and resulting climate change.
In most of its first two centuries, modern economic growth was located in a small number of countries, in Western Europe, North America and Oceania, and in Japan (Maddison 2001) . In the third quarter of the twentieth century, it extended into a number of relatively small economies in East Asia. A new era began in the fourth quarter of the past century, with the rapid extension of the beneficent processes of modern economic development into the heartland of the populous countries of Asia, including China, India and Indonesia. Incomes are now growing rapidly in a large proportion of the developing world.
In the absence of a major dislocation of established trends, fast growth is likely to continue for a considerable period. The contemporary slow-down in the United States and some other industrialised countries will reduce average total global growth for a while, but is unlikely to break the momentum of strong Chinese, developing-country and global growth. The first two decades of the twenty-first century will see a greater absolute increase in annual human output and consumption than was generated in the whole previous history of our species, and then almost that much again in the next decade to 2030 (Garnaut 2008b ).
This growth is heavily dependent on energy use. Rising global energy prices can be expected to reduce substantially the growth in petroleum consumption, but not necessarily the rate of expansion of total fossil-fuel emissions, given the widespread availability of coal-the most emissions-intensive fuel. This is true for most countries that do not have stringent greenhouse gas control policies in place, and certainly for China.
China is poised to be the main engine of world growth in the next two decades.
China is also one of the world's countries most reliant on coal for energy use, and therefore one of the world's most carbon-intensive countries-that is, it has one of the highest ratios of carbon dioxide emissions to energy use. China has already overtaken the United States as the largest global emitter (MNP 2008) . The combination of China's large, rapidly growing economy and its carbon intensity means that in the coming years it will have an influence on greenhouse gas emissions unmatched by any other country.
Action will be needed by all major economies to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to levels that limit the risk of climate change to acceptable levels. Given China's unique position, its policies will be crucial for global climate change prospects.
In this chapter, we analyse recent trends in China's growth including for energy and carbon dioxide emissions and present business-as-usual 6 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Co2/GDP Energy/GDP CO2/energy Notes: Emissions growth is carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels (excluding industrial processes). Energy growth is total primary energy supply measured in million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). GDP growth is measured using 2000 US$ purchasing power parity (PPP 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 Many of the efficiency gains in the 1990s were, however, one-offs, and the move towards greater private-sector control of the economy weakened the emphasis on energy-saving measures. Quadrelli and Peterson (2007) A business-as-usual projection This section projects fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide emissions to 2030 under a business-as-usual, constant-policy approach.
6 Policies already in place to reduce emissions are assumed to continue, but it is assumed no new ones are put in place, even if a government has committed to do so. We start with projections from the most recent International Energy Agency (IEA) 2007 World Energy Outlook (IEA 2007a) , which make use of extensive information on energy systems in a partial-equilibrium framework. Using an emissions-growth decomposition framework, we then make adjustments, based on the analysis presented in this chapter, to selected macroeconomic assumptions-namely, GDP growth in non-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and the intensity of energy use with regard to GDP in China. The strength of this approach is that it builds on the specialist knowledge of the IEA, and makes clear what assumptions might need rethinking. Its limitation is that it does not capture the general-equilibrium effects that would derive from the changes in assumptions.
GDP
We review and adjust IEA (2007a) growth rates for the three most-populous developing countries-China, India and Indonesia-and for other developing and transitional regions.
Our growth forecasts for China draw on the growth-accounting framework of Perkins and Rawski (2008) . As Table 8 .2 shows, we accept the Perkins-Rawski projections for educationenhanced labour, and assume a figure of 3.1 per cent total factor productivity (TFP) growth for the entire period, which is the rate of TFP growth in the past decade. Perkins and Rawski assume a slow-down in the rate of capital formation, but investment rates are rising, and Garnaut and Huang (2005) argue that these are in fact likely to rise even higher than current levels. Under the assumptions deployed, all developing and transitional countries are projected to be growing faster than they were in the latter decades of the past century, but slower than at rates observed in the past four years-with the exception of Indonesia.
Energy intensity
The IEA (2007a) projects significant falls in the energy intensities of developing countries from current levels. 8 Although this is inconsistent with historical experience (Figure 8. 3), we accept it on the grounds that high energy prices might induce greater efforts to improve energy efficiency.
Future trends in energy intensity in China are a matter for debate. This is not surprising given the variability of past trends (Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 ). Will the downward trend in energy intensity observed in the 1980s and 1990s resume, or is the recent cessation of that trend a permanent break?
The IEA assumes that the downward trend will resume, and that China will reduce energy intensities by 2.5 per cent per annum until 2015, and then by 2.8 per cent to 2030. This projection is consistent with the position of some observers that China uses energy inefficiently and has plenty of room to improve (Cooper 2004 ).
China's energy intensity is high if market exchange rates are used to compare economies, but less so if purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used. Moreover, the international experience does not suggest that energy intensity falls in the course of development. As Figure 8 .3
shows, China has been the exception rather than the rule. In most developing countries, and as an average, the energy intensity of the economy has been remarkably constant in the past Developing countries excl. China China three and a half decades.
A closer examination of economies whose development path China might be thought to be following-Japan, Korea and Taiwan-similarly belies the notion that energy intensity falls as countries develop (Figure 8.4) . Analysis of the historical experience of Japan, Taiwan and Korea shows only small decreases in energy intensity as per capita income increases, with energy intensity roughly flattening out at levels well above that assumed by the IEA for China in coming decades.
The IEA (2007a) argues that energy intensity will fall as the structure of the Chinese economy shifts from heavy to light industry. It is true that China has put in place a number of policies to slow the growth of energy-intensive sectors: for example, through taxes on energy-intensive exports (see the next section). The shift to heavy industry is, however, no more than would be expected as an economy develops with a high level of investment (extraordinarily high in China's case) underpinning a shift in comparative advantage towards more capital-intensive manufacturing. Energy-intensive heavy industry has been growing so fast in China that its growth will have to fall very significantly for its share in the economy to fall.
We assume that energy intensities decline at two-thirds the rate assumed by the IEA. This
gives China a rate of energy-intensity reduction around the developing-country average. The 
Carbon intensity
We assume that the carbon intensities of energy use (carbon dioxide/total primary energy supply) stay broadly constant, in line with IEA projections. This is a conservative approach on two counts. First, in recent years, emission intensities have in fact been increasing in the developing world, due to the shift to coal, with a pronounced increase in carbon intensity in China. The tighter supply constraints on oil will continue to force substitution to other fuels. The prices for traded coal have increased in recent times also, but this reflects purely short-term supply constraints in mining and shipping rather than resource scarcity, and an expanded coal supply is expected to balance current excess demand.
Second, if energy use does turn out to be higher than projected by the IEA (as we argue it will), a disproportionate amount of the extra demand will be met by (emissions-intensive)
coal. In particular, our projections have emissions growing at about the same rate as energy The share of current non-OECD countries in global emissions would be more than 70 per cent.
After 2030, China's emissions growth will slow considerably, not least because its population growth will probably turn negative thus further slowing GDP growth. However, by 2030, it will be too late for the world to start acting on climate change. If the world does reach the levels of emissions projected in Figure 8 .5 it will have locked in dangerous levels of temperature increase in subsequent decades. In any case, if the world is still not on a climate change mitigation path, other developing countries are set to take over from China after 2030 as the prime drivers of rapid emissions: first India (on its way to overtaking China as the world's most populous country and, eventually, the largest economy), and then other regions including sub-Saharan Africa.
Clearly, China's growth path in the next two decades will be decisive for global climate change. Its policies and stance in international negotiations will be increasingly important influences on the global response to climate change.
China's climate change policies and goals
Recall that the projections in the previous section are constant-policy ones, assuming no further policy action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In reality, however, climate change is moving up the policy agenda in China.
China's National D evelopm ent and Re form Commission, in it s National Climate Change Program (NDRC 2007) , noted a range of observed and projected c l i m a t i c c h a n g e s i n C h i n a , i n c l u d i n g t e m p e r a t u r e i n c r e a s e s , c h a n g e s i n precipitation patterns, increases of arid areas and risks of desertification, sea-level rise, the possibility of more frequent extreme weather or climate events and the accelerated retreat of glaciers. The NDRC put forth a set of objectives, principles and policies to deal with climate change. Reducing the energy intensity of the economy is motivated not predominantly by climate change objectives, but importantly by China's concerns about energy security (Downs 2004) , and by concerns about local environmental impacts such as air pollution. It is unclear to what extent comprehensive policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions will in fact be implemented-and, even if fully implemented, they will fall a long way short of stopping the growth in China's emissions.
The NDRC (2007:19) cautions that 'with [the] current level of technology development, to reach the development level of the industrialized countries, it is inevitable that per capita energy consumption and CO 2 emissions will reach a fairly high level'.
On the energy-supply side, a range of policies is aimed towards lowering carbon intensity 
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Annual emissions: gigatonnes of CO (NDRC 2007) . The share of renewable energy sources is to be increased under the Renewable Energy Law, predominantly through a doubling of hydropower capacity. Nuclear power capacity is to be quadrupled. Within thermal power generation, the development of highefficiency coal power plants is to be accelerated, and methane arising from coal-mining is to be utilised for power generation to a greater extent. China is also involved in initiatives with the United States, Europe and Australia on carbon capture and storage.
Programs to reduce emissions are also planned or are under way beyond the energy sector, such as accelerated reforestation and the development of rice varieties that are low in methane emissions (NDRC 2007) . Nevertheless, the target of constraining growth in energy use to half the rate of GDP growth could be a useful yardstick in years to come, and could underpin a possible international commitment on national emissions by China.
Possible commitments by China in an effective global mitigation regime
Strong domestic policy action in China is likely to eventuate only if there is strong action in other major countries, especially the United States. Political change is under way in the United States, with growing support in Congress for domestic policies to control greenhouse gas emissions. Both presidential candidates for the upcoming election are running on platforms that include goals of reducing US emissions by 60 per cent (John McCain) and 80 per cent (Barack Obama) by 2050, compared with 1990 levels.
How far the negotiations under the UN 'Bali road-map'-or indeed any alternative negotiating framework-can take the world towards effective climate change mitigation depends in large measure on the commitments that China and the United States are prepared to make. China's dominance in global emissions and emerging importance as a global economic force mean that it is no longer credible to claim that mitigation has to be undertaken exclusively in industrialised countries. Effective mitigation of climate change will require global emissions to peak in the near future, and then decline to well below current levels (IPCC 2007) . Given fast emissions growth in China and other developing countries, and their rapidly rising share in global emissions, emissions need to be limited and then reduced in all countries.
As argued by the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut 2008a) , broad international acceptance of national emissions limits will require a heavy emphasis on per capita measures, leading ultimately to equal per capita emissions rights across all countries. This would have to be implemented gradually, and fast-growing countries close to the world average per capita emissions would need to be given some headroom to allow their emissions to go above the global average for a limited time. China is in this situation, with emissions per person soon to reach the global average on a fast-rising curve. Headroom could take the form of the emissionintensity target applying for a number of years, before shifting to a trajectory of reductions in per capita emissions.
Consistent with this, a first and significant step for China would be to hold the growth in its carbon dioxide emissions to half the rate of its GDP growth, as shown by Trajectory A in Figure   8 .6. This would be consistent with China's announced policy for halving its energy intensity by 2020, and increased use of renewable and other low-emissions energy to counterbalance increases in high-emissions coal. Over time, adherence to this trajectory would drive emission levels significantly below business-as-usual levels. In 2030, China's fossil-fuel emissions would be almost one-third lower than in the business-as-usual case-and the same as they would be Even this level of mitigation by China might not suffice. Garnaut et al. (2008) analyse what would be required to adhere to a limited stabilisation path (aiming not to exceed an atmospheric concentration of 550 parts per million of carbon dioxide). Realising any of mitigation Trajectories A, B or C would require strong policy action, including for fuel switching away from coal, expansion of renewable and/or nuclear power, geosequestration for carbon dioxide (carbon capture and storage) when and where available, and accelerated structural change and improvements in energy efficiency throughout the economy. It could, however, be less difficult to achieve than it appears at first sight. Rapid projected Emissions trading will be critical to providing incentives for China and other developing countries to participate in the international mitigation regime, but it is only one part of the story.
Increased industrial-country financing of the research, development and commercialisation of low-emissions technology, as well as the financing of the transfer of this technology to developing countries, will be critical.
Conclusion
It is in China more than anywhere else that global climate change mitigation will be decided. If China does not participate in the global mitigation effort, its emissions will continue to grow rapidly and will account for a rising share of global emissions. Many 'mainstream' analyses underestimate likely economic growth in years to come, and could be too optimistic about reductions in the energy intensity and carbon intensity of China's energy system, unless there are strong and comprehensive policies to reduce emissions. Indeed, with high oil prices, there might be a strong shift to coal, which will further increase the rate of growth in emissions. Moreover, if China does not participate, or only participates marginally, in the global mitigation effort, there will be an indirect effect that will see other countries reduce their levels of ambition and effort since they will know that, without China, their efforts cannot avert climate change risks. On the other hand, if China does participate fully in global mitigation efforts, these two effects can be reversed. China's own emissions will be much lower, and other countries-industrialised and developing-are likely to do more.
China is starting to put a range of ambitious climate change policies in place, and has announced goals of reducing the energy intensity of the economy and increasing the share of low-emissions energy. If implemented, these policies will limit emissions growth to well below the business-as-usual trajectory. China's goal of limiting the growth in energy use to half the growth rate of the economy could become the basis for a near-term emissions target that will allow it to play a leading role in international discussions. Constraining the growth of China's emissions in this way could be compatible with the start-up phase of an international system of per capita emissions converging to a common and lower level, with some headroom provided in the interim for fast-growing developing countries.
Notes
1 The Kaya identity further decomposes economic growth into population growth and growth in income per capita. 2 Since energy intensity and carbon intensity are declining, acceleration for them means that they are declining less rapidly. 3 Growth in other greenhouse gas emissions is thought to be much slower. Emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, which account for about one-sixth of China's emissions in carbon dioxide equivalent terms, are reported to have grown by only 0.6 per cent per annum from 1994 to 2004 (NDRC 2007). 4 In 2006, energy consumption grew by 9.6 per cent, and GDP by 11.6 per cent (NBS 2007a (NBS , 2008a . 5 See NBS (2007b) . 6 This section draws heavily on Garnaut et al. (2008) . 7 We extend the latter projection to 2030. 8 The IEA projects an annual average decline of 1.8 per cent for energy intensity in the developing world excluding China in the next 25 years. 9 China is investing in coal-to-liquid plants and is expected to start operating the largest such facility outside South Africa later in 2008. See Nakanishi and Niu (2008) .
